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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY , 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants , 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
Defendants-
Respondents 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in construing 
the opinion of this court and directions for remand in Halladay 
v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d, 500 (Utah 1984) by allowing defendant 
Cluff the opportunity to argue the merits of an issue which was 
conceded by defendant Cluff and from which defendant Cluff 
did not file a cross-appeal. 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
3. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
Halladay v. Cluff, No. 860079-CA filed July 10, 1987, reported as 
Halladay v. Cluff, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987). A copy 
of the opinion in included in the Appendix hereto. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Case No, 
JURISDICTION 
1. The date of the entry of the decision sought to be 
reviewed is July 10, 1987. 
2. There have been no requests for rehearing and no 
extension of time for filing the petition for certiorari 
has been granted. 
3. Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred upon the 
court by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3)(a) and by Rule 42, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
The original appeal of this case was filed on or about 
October 13, 1981, and the opinion of the Supreme Court was 
issued on May 1, 1984. Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500 (Utah 
1984). Therefore, the rule of appellate procedure applicable 
to the original appeal was Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which reads: 
Where any one or more parties have filed a notice 
of appeal as required by Rule 73, other parties may 
separately or together cross appeal from the order or 
judgment of the lower court without filing a notice of 
appeal; provided, however, such party or parties shall 
file a statement of the points on which he intends to 
rely on such cross appeal within the time and as required 
by subdivision (d) of Rule 75. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff brought this action seeking to quiet title to 
certain property shown as Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A attached 
hereto• Defendant Cluff counterclaimed attempting to quiet 
title to that same property by virtue of the doctrine of 
boundary of acquiescence and also to quiet title to Parcel 
W-X-Y-Z shown on Exhibit A. The trial court quieted title to 
Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow and quieted 
title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed 
from the court's ruling with respect to Parcel P-M-N-O. 
Neither defendant Cluff nor defendant Bigelow filed a cross-
appeal with respect to the court's ruling on the W-X-Y-Z 
parcel. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
judgment as to the P-M-N-0 parcel and remanded the case 
"...with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the 
record owners." Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500, 502 (Utah 
1984). The court held that the decree relying on the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence 
in quieting the claimants' title to Parcel A-B-C-D 
[Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A] must therefore be 
reversed. 
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The decree is reversed, the case is remanded 
to the District Court for the entry of a new decree 
in conformity with this opinion. 
685 P. 2d at 507-508. 
On remand, defendant Cluff urged that this court's state-
ment "enter a new decree in conformity with this opinion," 
meant that the trial court should enter a decree quieting title 
to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in defendant Cluff. The lower court ruled 
against defendant Cluff on that matter and defendant Cluff 
filed an appeal with this court, Case No. 20318. 
This court transferred that appeal to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). It was assigned 
Case No. 860079-CA. On July 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals 
entered its opinion in favor of defendant Cluff. It is reported 
at 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987), a copy of which is 
included in the Appendix hereof. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This court has already decided the appeal of this 
matter on the merits in Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500 
(1984). A copy of that case is included in the Appendix 
hereof. The issues presented on this appeal largely involve 
procedural matters and do not require a lengthy recitation 
of facts. This petition involves defendant Cluffs right to 
reverse the trial court's decree that Parcel W-X-Y-Z should 
be quieted in plaintiffs. With respect to that parcel, 
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plaintiffs put on evidence to establish the elements of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and plaintiff's counsel 
was in the middle of cross-examination of defendant Cluff 
with respect thereto when the court called a bench conference. 
The record of that exchange and the questioning just 
prior thereto is as follows: 
Q. Now, so we are not misunderstanding each other, it is 
your testimony that they didnft ever drive into here? 
A. Not regularly, no. Not on a regular basis. 
Q. You donft recall — 
The Court: Mr. Jeffs and Mr. Lewis, will you come to the 
Bench for just a minute. 
(Discussion off the record between the Court and all 
counsel) 
The Court: As a result of a Bench Conference, I think 
there is no issue on that particular area Mr. Young. 
Mr. Young: The area of "W", "X", "Y", and "Z" on Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 8? 
The Court: Yes. 
(Trial Transcript, pp. 133-134) (Record at 172-173). 
Following the bench conference and the comments made by 
the court with respect thereto, no further evidence was presented 
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, nor was there further agrument 
thereon. As shown on Exhibit A, Parcel W-X-Y-Z is a strip of 
ground which is included in defendant Cluff's record title, but 
outside of an existing fenceline that has been there for more 
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than fifty years, (Trial Transcript, p. 60) (Record at 99). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT CLUFF HAVING ABANDONED HER CLAIM 
TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z AND HAVING FAILED TO FILE 
A CROSS-APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S JUDGMENT WITH 
RESPECT THERETO, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FOLLOWING 
REMAND WITH RESPECT TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z. 
As noted in the foregoing Statement of the Case, the 
trial court quieted title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs and 
Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow. Plaintiffs 
appealed from the court's ruling with respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 
and this court reversed the lower court. Halladay v. Cluff, 
supra. No cross-appeal was filed by defendant Cluff with 
respect to the W-X-Y-Z parcel. On remand defendant Cluff 
argued that this court's opinion in Halladay v« Cluff, supra, 
should be applied to reverse the trial court's earlier decision 
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and quiet title to that property 
in defendant Cluff by virtue of the recorded deed lines. The 
trial court held that that issue was not before the court on 
remand because defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal. 
Defendant Cluff appealed the court's decision and the Court of 
Appeals agreed with defendant Cluff. The case was remanded to 
the District Court to determine whether or not defendant Cluff 
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is entitled to the W-X-Y-Z parcel by virtue of the evidence in 
the record. 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals was 
persuaded by defendant Cluff's argument that either the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence or the recorded title line should be 
applied to both Parcel P-M-N-0 and Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Without 
reviewing or discussing the facts relative to the application 
of boundary of acquiescence to either parcel, the court simply 
concluded that either boundary by acquiescence or the title 
line should be applied in each case. Such an approach however, 
is an extreme over simplification of the facts giving rise to 
boundary by acquiescence with respect to each parcel. Plaintiffs 
in presenting their evidence regarding the applicability of 
boundary by acquiescence as to Parcel W-X-Y-Zf were stopped by the 
court, a bench conference ensued, and it was concluded that there 
was no issue as to boundary by acquiescence with respect to 
Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Defendant Cluff, essentially, was conceding that 
question. Plaintiffs however, did not concede that issue with 
respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 and, when the trial court ruled against 
them, appealed that question to this court and were successful on 
appeal. 
Inasmuch as this court is not now in a position to evaluate 
the facts giving rise to the applicability of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, it is 
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sufficient to note that the applicability of that doctrine to 
that parcel is based on its own facts, and not a common set of 
facts that would make that doctrine applicable or not applicable 
to both parcels universally. Defendant Cluff's argument that the 
court must uniformly apply title lines or fence lines ignores the 
proposition that whether or not fence lines or title lines are 
applied depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
The court could consistently apply a fence line to one parcel 
and a deed or title line to another parcel depending on the 
factual circumstances giving rise to the dispute in each 
instance. 
Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at 
the time plaintiffs1 appeal was filed, reads as follows: 
Where any one or more parties have filed a notice 
of appeal as required by Rule 73, other parties may 
separately or together cross appeal from the order or 
judgment of the lower court without filing a notice of 
appeal; provided, however, such party or parties shall 
file a statement of the points on which he intends to 
rely on such cross appeal within the time and as required 
by subdivision (d) of Rule 75. 
In Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institute, 617 P. 
2d 700 (Utah 1980) the court discussed Rule 74(b) at some 
length. After quoting Rule 74(b)f the court quoted Rule 75(d) 
and then added its own comments. 
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal, or if 
the appellant has filed a statement of points ... and the 
respondent desires to have the appellate court consider 
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other or additional matters, the respondent shall, within 
10 days after the service and filing of appellant's 
designation ... serve and file a statement of respondent's 
points either by way of such cross-appeal or for the 
purpose of having considered other or additional matters 
than those raised by the appellant." 
From the just-quoted rules, it could hardly be clearer 
that if a respondent desires to attack the judgment and 
change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal 
which plainly states the propositions he intends to rely 
on as entitling him to relief. This conforms with the 
desired objective of giving his opponent and the court a 
clear and definite understanding of the issues to be 
treated and of thus proving a firm foundation upon which 
the case is to proceed. (Emphasis in original) 
617 P. 2d 701. 
The Court of Appeals, although acknowledging Rule 74(b) 
and this court's opinion in Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institute, supra, simply brushed the rule aside by its simplistic 
view of the case. The Court of Appeals viewed the case as an 
all or nothing proposition. Either boundary by acquiescence 
applied or title lines applied. The Court of Appeals ruled 
that since defendant Cluff had succeeded as to Parcel P-M-N-0 in 
the trial court, that defendant Cluff had won the case and 
therefore needed no cross-appeal. However, an examination of the 
claims made by the parties reveals, as shown above, that different 
facts apply to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence may or not have applied to that parcel. As noted 
earlier, plaintiffs' presentation of evidence on that issue was 
interrupted by the court and after conference it was conceded 
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that defendant Cluff did not claim that property and the 
evidence then turned to Parcel P-M-N-O. Although the Court of 
Appeals found that the concession made by defendant Cluff was 
ambigous, the comments made by counsel and the court which 
supposedly created the ambiguity were made prior to the 
presentation of the evidence. 
Mr. Jeffs: What I am sayingf when I said the same 
principle liesf if the Court is going to follow title 
lines rather than boundary by acquiescence, then we 
should be entitled to the green slashed area. And we 
believe that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to orange 
slashed area to this title line, that we are entitled to 
move over to the title line. That there should be a 
consistency. 
The Court: The facts will possibly change the circum-
stances one place or another — 
Mr. Jeffs: That's possible. 
The Court: Depending. But as far as the fenceline 
is concerned here, you don't claim to the west of 
it, right? 
Mr. Jeffs: That's true. We think that it became there by 
boundary by acquiescence, the same as we claim the other 
piece. 
But, if the Court were to adopt the rule that there was 
no boundary by acquiescence, and you are going to examine 
the title, then I think we would be entitled to that 
title. * * * 
The Court: Lets get on with this Court's tasks that we 
have now. So there will be no stipulations on that. 
(Trial transcript p. 16-17, Record at 55-56). 
As is readily apparent from reviewing the above colloquy, 
there were no stipulations as to boundaries prior to the 
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presentation of the evidence, but after the evidence was put 
on, it was conceded by defendant Cluff that there was no issue 
on the W-X-Y-Z parcel. Defendant Cluff could have made the 
argument, as did plaintiffs, that the lack of a dispute or 
uncertainty with respect to the boundary of the W-X-Y-Z parcel 
precluded plaintiffs from claiming that property by boundary by 
acquiescense. 
The Court of Appeals has departed from this court's 
consistent application of Rule 74(b) to deny the raising of 
issues which have not been properly preserved by a cross-appeal. 
Terry v. Zions Mercantile Institute, supra; Bentley v. Potter, 
694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984); Cerritos Trucking Company v. Utah 
Venture No. 1, 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982); and Eliason v. Watts, 
615 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1980). Although the Court of Appeals 
distinguishes this case because the court felt that defendant 
Cluff had "won" in the lower court, the fact is that defendant 
Cluff not only lost with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, but she 
voluntarily conceded that issue. Contrary to defendant Cluff1s 
position this court did not change the rules regarding boundary 
by acquiescence but merely clarified that the element of 
dispute or uncertainty is a factor to be considered as set 
forth in earlier cases. Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P. 2d 726 (Utah 
1981); Wright v. Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974). 
It appears that defendant Cluff and the Court of Appeals 
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read too much into this court's instructions to the trial court 
to enter a "new decree in conformity with this opinion." Halladay 
v. Cluff, supra at 508. The court noted in that opinion, that the 
only issue before the court was with respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 
and the court specifically reversed the trial court on that issue 
"with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the record 
owners." Halladay v. Cluff, supra at 502. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, sets forth some 
guidelines for the exercise of the court's discretion in granting 
a petition for writ of certiorari. Subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Rule 
43 read as follows: 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided 
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this Court; (3) When a 
panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision 
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of this Court's power of supervision. 
In this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals clearly 
conflicts with earlier pronouncements of this court regarding 
the application of Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It provides for a remand of matters which were not preserved 
by a cross-appeal, which is a clear and substantial departure 
from the normal course of judicial proceedings. Therefore, 
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plaintiffs respectfully request that the court grant their 
petition for a writ of certiorari, to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Dated this / & day of August, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed four copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, postage prepaid, to S. Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney 
for Defendants Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney 
for Defendant Cluff, addressed follows this / 0 day of August, 
1987. 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
S. REX LEWIS 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorney at Law 
120 East 300 North 
:ovo, Utah 84601 
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know it and didn't disclose it, or 
are you going to claim vour evid-
ence is they knew it and didn't 
disclose it9 
MR. FRANDSEN. I don't know 
whether they knew it or not. I 
asked him if there was any other 
indebtedness and they said so [sic). 
So I paid them the balance that was 
owing based upon their represent-
ations. 
THE COURT: You're not going to 
have any evidence they knew about 
it, had actual knowledge as opposed 
to information because it was on 
the record9 
MR. FRANDSEN: No, I don't 
know if they had knowledge. I 
can't prove that, Your Honor. 
Frandsen went forward and presented his 
case.3 True to his word, he produced no evi-
dence that any of the individual defendants, 
including Biesmger, had actual knowledge in 
October, 1981, that Laubs' judgment had 
been filed in Weber Countv or that the lien 
thereof had attached to the subject property. 
Constructive knowledge imparted by the filing 
of the judgment was charged to Frandsen by 
law, as well as to defendants. See Utah Code 
A n n . §17-21-11 (1987) and §57-1-6 
(1986); Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 
P.2d 242 (1931). 
In dismissing appellant's causes of actions 
against all the named defendants,4 the lower 
court concluded that Frandsen 'did not reas-
onably rely on any statements or omissions of 
the defendants, m that the Judgment hen of 
the Laubs was of public record ...." The jud-
gment below is affirmed Costs are awarded to 
respondents Max and Eva Laub. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1 CONCUR-
Richard C Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1 Thirty percent of a one-third interest is actually 
9.99Vo, not 10^ o 
2 Frandsen's second cause of action was based on 
alleged violation of Utah Code Ann §48-1-17 
(1981), which provides 
Duty of partners to render information 
Partners shall render on demand true 
and full information of all things affe-
cting the partnership to any partner, or 
the legal representatives of any deceased 
partner, or partner under legal disabi-
lity 
However, Frandsen alleged in his Amended 
Amended Complaint that Biesmger sold his partne-
rship interest on June 12, 1981 and that at the time 
Laubs' judgment was docketed, Biesmger did not 
have any interest in the partnership Franasen's 
evidence did noi contradict those allegations In 
fact, Biesmger was never a partner The partnership 
consisted of two corporations and Frandsen See 
Burke \ Farrell, 656 P 2d 1015 (Utah 1982), and 
Velson v Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P 865 (1910), 
which discuss the fiduciary dut> that exists between 
partners 
3 In some jurisdictions, these actions by Frandsen 
would be sufficient to constitute his waiver of 
default by any of the defendants, even if default 
had aheadv been entered 47 Am Jur 2d Judgm-
ents §1161(1969) 
4 In this appeal, Frandsen has not challenged the 
judgment below insofar as it dismissed his compla-
ints against the defendants other than Biesmger and 
the Laubs. 
Cue is 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Mack HALL AD AY and Merle Hailaday, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigeiow, and Norma 
G. Bigeiow, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Or me, Garff, and Jackson. 
No. 860079-CA 
FILED: July 10, 1987 
FOURTH DISTRICT 
Hon George E. Ballif 
ATTORNEYS: 
Daylc M. Jeffs for Appellant. 
Brent D Young, S Rex Lewis for 
Respondents 
j OPINION 
| ORME, Judge: 
Halladays commenced this action to quiet 
J title to a parcel of property sometimes referred 
to as the orange parcel. They relied on their 
I holding actual legal title. Cluff counterclaimed 
seeking to quiet title to the orange parcel on 
the basis of boundary by acquiescence and, 
alternatively, seeking to quiet title to another 
parcel of property, sometimes referred to as 
I the green parcel, if the court determined to 
adjudicate the rights of the parties with refe-
rence to legal titles rather than on the basis of 
boundary by acquiescence. The unusual situ-
ation came about because Halladays held legal 
title to the orange parcel, which Cluff1 occu-
pied, while Cluff held legal title to the green 
parcel, which Halladays occupied If occup-
ancy controlled, Cluff would own the orange 
| parcel and Halladays the green. If legal title 
> controlled, Halladays would own the orange 
• parcel and Cluff the green Under no consis-
For complete Ltab Code Annotations, consult CodetCo's Annotation Service 
oi H A H AUV AJNIE REPORTS Codt«Co Prove Utah 
tently applied theory would either party be 
entitled to both parcels. 
Guff was successful at trial, persuading the 
court to adjust the parties' competing rights 
on the basis of the boundary by acquiescence 
doctrine. Thus, she was held to have title to 
the larger orange parcel primarily in dispute, 
but Halladays got the smaller green parcel on 
the same basis. 
Halladays appealed to the Supreme Court 
and were successful there. Halladay v. Cluff, 
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court 
held that boundary by acquiescence did not 
apply, given the facts developed at trial, and 
that legal title should control. See id. at 507. 
Of course, since the judgment had been 
adverse to Halladays only as concerned the 
orange parcel, the orange parcel was the focus 
of the appeal.2 The case was remanded for 
entry of "a new decree in conformity* with the 
Supreme Court's opinion. 
On remand, Cluff argued that consistency 
with the Supreme Court's analysis required 
that her alternative claim be granted. Cluff 
argued that if legal title was to control, it 
should control the whole dispute, and she 
should be awarded the green parcel, to which 
she held title. 
The trial court, however, concluded that 
Cluffs failure to take a cross-appeal from 
the determination concerning the green parcel 
foreclosed any re-examination of that issue. 
We cannot agree. Cross-appeals are properly 
limited to grievances a party has with the 
judgment as it was entered-not grievances 
it might acquire depending on the outcome of 
the appeal. See Cunningham v. Lynch-
Davidson Motors, lnc.y 425 So.2d 131, 133 
(Fla. App. 1982)(cross-appeal only required 
when respondent seeks to vary or modify 
judgment below); Terry v. Zions Co-Op. 
Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 
1980X"[IJf a respondent desires to attack the 
judgment and change it in his favor, he must 
timely file a cross-appeal ..."). See also 15 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Pra-
ctice and Procedure §3904 (1976). 
Cluff knew all along she could not have it 
both ways. Either boundary by acquiescence 
would apply, in which case she would win the 
larger parcel but lose the smaller, or legal titles 
would control, in which event she would lose 
the larger parcel but at least get the smaller 
one.3 She could not plausibly argue one theory 
as to one parcel and another as to the other 
and walk away with both contested parcels. 
On balance, Cluff would come out much 
better if the boundary by acquiescence argu-
ment carried the day. She accordingly argued 
for application of that theory. She prevailed at 
the trial level to the fuOest extent possible 
consistent with a disciplined decision, even 
though she "lost" as to the green parcel. 
Halladays appealed, arguing that legal titles, 
not the doctrine, should govern. Cluffs 
i proper response to that appeal was to resist 
j the Halladays* arguments and seek to have the 
! trial court affirmed. A cross-appeal would 
| not have been appropriate. Cluff had no dis-
satisfaction with the trial court's judgment, 
which she simply wanted to have affirmed. 
Moreover, a cross-appeal would have left 
Cluff and Halladays making inconsistent and 
contrary arguments depending on which parcel 
was being focused on.4 
I Thus, the absence of a cross-appeal did 
not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from 
I reassessing the status of the green parcel in 
j view of the Supreme Court's decision and 
I changing its decree as to that parcel as well, so 
the 'new decree" would be fully "in confor-
mity" with the doctrine expressed in the 
| Court's opinion.51 
However, for the trial court to be able to 
address the green parcel on remand, i.e., to 
reconsider the claim in the alternative that if 
j Cluff did not own the orange parcel she 
j owned the green one, it would be necessary 
that that claim had not been compromised, 
dismissed, or otherwise unconditionally disp-
I osed of. If, as Halladays suggest on this 
\ appeal, Cluff unqualifiedly waived her claim 
| to the smaller parcel, without regard to the 
disposition made as to the larger one or the 
legal doctrine underlying that disposition, 
Cluff would not be entitled to any relief. If, 
j on the other hand, the claim to the green 
parcel was expressly preserved or had been 
resolved only as a necessary part of the basic 
determination concerning boundary by acqu-
iescence, Cluff would clearly be entitled to an 
opportunity to show the trial court that the 
Supreme Court's reversal as to the larger 
parcel necessitates a "reversal" as to the other.* 
We have reviewed the record, with consid-
erable care, with an eye toward determining 
I whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived. 
| Cluffs counterclaim was crystal clear that she 
| should be declared the owner of the orange 
parcel on the basis of the doctrine of boun-
I dary by acquiescence, but that if she was 
unsuccessful, she should be declared the owner 
of the green parcel because of the "identical 
circumstances" concerning each parcel. At 
trial, Cluff explained her position, through 
counsel, in response to the court's initial 
perception that she was conceding her rights to 
the green parcel: 
What I'm saying, when I said the 
same principle lies, if the Court is 
going to follow title lines, rather 
than boundary by acquiescence, 
i then we would be entitled- to the 
j green slashed area. And we believe 
I that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to 
the orange slashed area to this title 
line, that we are entitled to move 
| over to the title line. That there 
j 
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should be a consistency 
Counsel for Halladavs then sought to chara-
cterize Guffs position as conceding the green 
parcel The court explained that Cluff simply 
wanted a consistent legal approach and conc-
luded by observing "So there will be no stip-
ulations on that " The parties then presented 
their evidence. After argument, the court 
issued a written decision It recited no waiver 
or concession by Cluff as to the green parcel, 
but rather reached the merits and found that 
Halladays had established entitlement to it on 
the basis of boundary by acquiescence under 
the cases of Fuoco v Wilhams, 15 Utah 2d 
156, 389 P 2d 143 (1964), and Hales v Frames, 
600 P 2d 556 (1979) Conversely, the trial 
court found, relying principally on the same 
cases, that Cluff had established entitlement to 
the orange parcel on the basis of boundary by 
acquiescence Subsequently, the court entered 
Findings and Conclusions which reflect that 
the court reached the merits on both the green 
and the orange parcels and decided both sit-
uations on the basis of a consistent application 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
A single, short decree recited the result of the 
court's decision and quieted title to the green 
parcel in Halladays and the orange parcel in 
Cluff 
We see in none of this any concession or 
waiver by Cluff The only place to which 
Halladays specifically point us in support of 
their contention that there was such a waiver, 
is at best ambiguous The exchange followed 
an unreported bench conference and is, in its 
entirety, as follows 
The Court As a result of a Bench 
Conference, I think there is no issue 
on that particular area, Mr Young 
Mr Young The area of "W", »X" 
"Y" and "Z" on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
8*> 
The Court: Yes. 
While we would m any event be unwilling to 
construe that bnef exchange between the court 
and Halladays* counsel as a concession by 
Cluff, we are especially not inclined to do so 
since the court m its decision made no 
mention of any concession or waiver by Cluff, 
but rather spoke in terms of a decision on the 
merits At the hearing before the trial court 
following remand by the Supreme Court, 
Halladays* counsel acknowledged that the 
green parcel had been tned and not resolved 
by stipulation. Moreover, the court's remarks 
at that hearing, and in its subsequent written 
ruling, make clear the exclusive basis for its 
decision not to reconsider its disposition of the 
green parcel was its conclusion that the failure 
of Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from 
doing so. No mention was made by the court 
of any pre-judgment concession or waiver by 
Cluff 
j Accordingly, the trial court's order of 
October 18, 1984 is vacated and the case is 
again remanded to the trial court "for the 
entry of a new decree in conformity with* the 
Supreme Court's pnor decision In that 
regard, Cluff is entitled to an opportunity to 
show the trial court that the evidence adduced 
at trial as to the green parcel, when squared 
with the Supreme Court's decision, entitles 
Cluff to the green parcel If it does, the "new 
decree" contemplated by the Supreme Court 
should so provide Costs of this appeal to 
Cluff 
Gregory K Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
R. W Garff, Judge 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
1 The orange parcel was actually occupied and 
claimed by the Bigelows and Guff, adjacent land-
owners, apparently as though the undisputed bou-
ndary between them continued on through the 
orange parcel Bigelows are not parties to the instant 
appeal and in the interest of simplicity we refer only 
to Cluff even in situations where technically the 
reference should be to 'Cluff and Bigelows * 
2 The orange parcel, labeled MNOP on d u f f s 
exhibits, was referred to in Halladay v Cluff, 685 
P 2d 500 (Utah 1981), as the ABCD parcel Id at 
502 The green parcel, labeled WXYZ on the exhi-
bits, was not delineated on the Supreme Court's 
map, but lies to the west of the ADE line on their 
map Sec id 
3 The trial court appreciated the need for a consi-
stent approach to the entire dispute and later refe-
rred to its decree as *a fence-line decree * 
4 The facts of this case are extremely unusual and 
it might even look like a case where some kind of 
"contingent" cross-appeal should have been filed 
That illusion disappears if one focuses not on the 
component pans of the dispute but rather on the 
dispute as a whole and the pivotal role in us resol-
ution of the selection and consistent applicauon of 
one of two competing legal doctrines Generally, 
however, the decision whether to cross appeal is 
simple If a respondent wishes to modify or vary the 
tnal court's judgment, he must cross appeal See 
Mann v Oppcnhcimcr & Co , 517 A 2d 1056, 1060 
(Del Supr 1986X"[A]bsent a cross-appeal, the 
[respondent! may not attack the judgment of the 
court below with a view to enlarging its own rights 
or lessening the nghts of its adversary "), Terry v 
Zions Co-Op Mercantile Inst, 617 P 2d 700, 701 
(Utah 1980) If he only wants the judgment affi-
rmed, he should not cross appeal Nothing in this 
opinion should be taken to create allowances for 
parties who should cross appeal but do not See, 
eg, Bentiey v Porrer, 694 P 2d 617, 622 (Utah 
1984), Cemtos Trucking Co v Utah Venture No 
1, 645 P 2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982), Ehason v Watts, 
615 P 2d 427, 431 (Utah 1980) See also Ryan v 
State, 150 Ariz 549, 724 P 2d 1218, 223 (Ariz App 
1986)(respondent can't raise assignment of error 
because issue not made subject of cross appeal), 
Broadhead v McEntire, 19 Ark App 259, 720 
S W 2 d 313, 318 (1986Xrespondent can't argue for 
specific performance because filed no cross-
appeal), Hein Enterprises, Ltd v S F Real Estate 
Invs , 720 P 2d 975 , 980 (Co lo App 
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1985){respondem's failure to perfect cross-appeal 
precluded raising attorney's fee issue) 
5 Trial courts are in a much better position to 
evaluate an entire case, including its nuances and 
undisclosed pitfalls, than an appellate court. It is for 
this reason that where, as in this case, all possible 
ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be 
readily apparent, a case will be remanded for such 
proceedings as are appropriate in view of the guid-
ance offered in the opinion. It is no doubt for this 
reason the Supreme Court, m addition to specific-
ally directing the trial court to quiet title to the 
orange parcel m the Halladays, remanded in general 
terms for "the entry of a new decree in conformity 
with* its opinion. 
6 Loosely following the trial court's characteriza-
tion quoted in Note 2, supra, Cluff wants nothing 
more than an opportunity to persuade the trial court 
that the Supreme Court's decision simply means the 
court's decree should have been a "title-lines 
decree" rather than a "fence-line decree." 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRAY LINES INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH CARRIERS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and G. Eugene England, an 
individual. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood and Orme. 
No. 860133-CA 
FILED: July 10, 1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Raymond S. Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
John T. Caine for Appellant. 
Michael K. Mohrman for Respondent. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
G. Eugene England appeals from* the trial 
court's granting of Bray Lines Incorporated's 
motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 
In April of 1978. Bray Lines Incorporated 
("Bray Lines") was approached by Duane 
Barker ("Barker"), president of International 
Contract Carriers trucking company. In that 
capacity, Barker entered into negotiations with 
Bray Lines for the purchase of its Interstate 
Commerce Commission ("ICC") authority to 
operate motor carrier service over certain 
routes. Barker was advised that Bray Lines 
could not sell the authority directly to an exi-
sting company, but could only sell it to a new 
entity. For purposes of satisfying the ICC's 
I requirements for the sale of authority, Barker 
established Utah Carriers Incorporated ("Utah 
Carriers") with his father-in-law, G. Eugene 
England ("England") as President and a dire-
! ctor of the corporation. 
On April 12, 1978, Bray Lines transferred 
its authority to operate a motor carrier service 
to Utah Carriers. In exchange, Utah Carriers 
executed and delivered to Bray Lines a pro-
missory note for the sum of $309,438.49. The 
promissory note was signed on behalf of Utah 
Carriers by England, President. Also on April 
12, 1978, England executed an unconditional 
personal guarantee as collateral for the prin-
cipal obligation. Following consummation of 
this arrangement, England was not active in 
the operations of Utah Carriers nor was he 
compensated by Utah Carriers. 
In 1980, the trucking industry was deregul-
ated, rendenng the previously granted opera-
ting authority worthless. Subsequently, Utah 
Carriers defaulted on the note; Bray Lines 
consequently filed suit against Utah Carriers 
and England to recover the $44,556.39 outst-
j anding balance. The court granted summary 
judgment against both defendants. 
I. 
I Summary judgment should be granted only 
j when it is clear from the undisputed facts that 
I the opposing partv cannot prevail. Frisbec v. 
\ K SL K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
1984); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In conside-
I ring a summary judgment, the court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable 
| inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment. Fnsbee, 676 P.2d at 389. 
This Court must determine whether the undi-
sputed facts support the trial court's conclu-
sion that England, as a matter of law, was 
I liable on his personal guarantee. 
n. 
England asserts that enforcement of the 
note and guarantee would be unconscionable 
because the operating rights were rendered 
worthless due to deregulation. The determin-
ation of whether a contract is unconscionable 
is made with reference to the conditions that 
existed at the time the contract was executed. 
Bekms Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 
461 (Utah 1983). In analyzing whether the 
| contract is unconscionable, it is appropriate to 
| consider the terms of the contract as well as 
the relative positions of the parties and circu-
mstances surrounding the execution of the 
j contract. Id. 
i In this case, the terms of the guarantee are 
1
 unambiguous, straightforward, and understa-
1
 ndable.1 Moreover, there is no evidence of a 
! gross inequality of bargaining power. Rather, 
I the parties are expenenced in business and 
they freely entered into this business venture; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 53,243 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on the 21st day of September, 
1984, wherein the court heard oral argument from counsel as to 
the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the 
Supreme Court, and all of counsel were heard and the court having 
tnoroughly considered the alternatives, and the language of the 
Supreme Court directing that they " . . . reverse with directions 
to quiet title in the Halladays, the record owners." 
It is noted that the plaintiffs Halladay appealed from the 
court's ruling as to that portion of defendant's Exhibit 12 
identified as "A", "E", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal 
was taken as to the court's finding of boundary by acquiescence 
as to Tracts 1 and 2 in Bigelow and Cluff respectively. Therefore, 
the only matter before the Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 
and that the same be auieted in the record owners. The court 
tnerefore directs counsel for Kalladays to prepare a new decree 
quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 along the des-
cription contained froir. points "A" to "B" to "C" to "D". 
Based upon the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That title to the following described property is 
is quieted in plaintiffs, Mack Halladay and. Merle Halladay: 
Commencing 488.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North 
from the Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
thence West 118.10 feet, thence North 0° 03f 17w 
East along a fence line 55.31 feet, thence South 89° 
51f 20" East along a fence line 118.20 feet thence 
South 0° 09f 25" West along a fence line, 55.01 feet 
to the point of beginning. Area .15 acres. 
2. That ail other claims raised by the defendants as 
against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and 
are res judicata. 
Dated: October / ^T , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ • ' ' - ^ * 
'cSEbRGE^  E. iBALLI-F, Judge 
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Mack HALLADAY and Merle Halladay. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigelow and 
Norma G. Bigelow, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 18032. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
In a boundary dispute, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., sustained defendants' ownership of dis-
puted tract under doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, and record owners of the 
tract appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that: (1) with regard to require-
ments that there must be uncertainty or 
dispute over location of boundary before 
claim based on boundary by acquiescence 
can be maintained, existence of dispute or 
uncertainty should be measured against ob-
jective test of reasonableness, so that dis-
pute is not proved by mere difference of 
opinion, and uncertainty is not proved by 
mere lack of actual knowledge of true loca-
tion of the boundary; (2) where boundary 
dispute involves property in city for which 
survey information is readily available, par-
ty claiming boundary by acquiescence has 
burden of proving objective uncertainty as 
one of the prima facie elements of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and 
(3) defendants failed to'establish applicabili-
ty of doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, 
where defendants had ready access to 
deeds and had actually examined surveys 
clearly establishing plaintiffs' record title 
to property in dispute. 
Reversed and remanded with di-
rections. 
Howe, J., filed an opinion concurring 
and dissenting. 
1. Boundaries <s=>48(3) 
Period of acquiescence required for re-
liance on a ''boundary by acquiescence" 
depends on the circumstances of the partic-
ular case, but only under unusual circum-
stances would period be less than 20 years. 
2. Boundaries <s=48(2) 
For purposes of rule that doctrine of 
"boundary by acquiescence" cannot be ap-
plied where there is no dispute or uncer-
tainty concerning location of the boundary, 
"dispute" is not proved by a mere differ-
ence of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not 
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge 
of the true location of the boundary; "dis-
pute or uncertainty" should be measured 
against an objective test of reasonableness, 
rather than against a subjective test under 
which a boundary line could be uncertain or 
in dispute even though capable of being 
readily ascertained; rejecting Ekberg v. 
Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 and 
Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 
175 P.2d 718. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Boundaries <S>48(2) 
Under doctrine of "boundary by acqui-
escence," property line shown on record 
title cannot be displaced by another bound-
ary unless it is shown that during the peri-
od of acquiescence there was some objec-
tively measurable circumstance in the 
record title or in the reasonably available 
survey information, or other technique by 
which record title information was located 
on the ground, that would have prevented a 
landowner, as a practical matter, from be-
ing reasonably certain about the true loca-
tion of the boundary; by the same token, a 
claimant cannot assert boundary by acqui-
escence if he or his predecessors in title 
had reason to know the true location of the 
boundary7 during the period of acquies-
cence. 
4. Boundaries <s=>48(2) 
Examples of objectively measurable 
uncertainties in location of boundary, based 
whicn doctrine of boundarv b\ acquies 
cence would be appropriate if the doctrine s 
other requirements Here met are inability 
to locate monuments established in original 
survev interna1 inconsistencies in plat no 
official or original plat or survev b\ which 
boundary line could be located disagree-
ment among different surveyors on loca-
hne landmarks refer-
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cence where claimants had read\ access to 
deeds and had actualh examined surveys 
clearh establismng adioimng landowners 
record title to property m dispute 
uon of boundary 
enced in deeds that have disappeared, un-
certainties or disputes created bv conflict 
mg terms in deeds such as overlapping 
description or metes and bounds descrip-
tions that do not close boundarv b\ acqui-
escence should also be available where 
there are other inconsistencies that create 
reasonable doubt m the meaning of the 
record title or m its application to the actu-
al on-the-ground location of the propertv 
identified in the record 
5. Boundaries c=>33 
Where boundary dispute involves prop-
erty m city for which survev information is 
readily available party claiming boundarv 
bv acquiescence has burden of proving ob-
jectiv e uncertainty about the location of the 
boundary as one of the prima facie ele-
ments of the doctrine of boundarv by ac-
quiescence, rejecting Brown i Milliner, 
120 Utah 16 232 P 2d 202, Wright v Cits-
sold 521 P 2d 1224 Universal Invest 
mentCorp i Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35 
484 P 2d 173 King i Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 
135 378 P 2d 893 Mortzkus v Carroll 7 
Utah 2d 237 322 P 2d 391 
6. Boundaries <s=»48(2) 
Notwithstanding allocation to party 
claiming boundary by acquiescence of bur 
den of proof of objective uncertainty as one 
of the prima facie elements of the doctrine 
of boundary of acquiescence, record land-
owner may conclusively negate the exist-
ence of objective uncertainty by proving 
that the claimant or his predecessors m 
title had reason to know the location of the 
true boundary before the expiration of the 
penod of acquiescence 
7. Boundaries ®=>48(2) 
Claimants failed to establish applicabil-
ity of doctrine of boundary by acquies-
Brent D Young, Provo for plaintiffs and 
appellants 
M Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Cluff 
S Rex Lewis Provo for Bigelow 
OAKS Justice 
This is an appeal from a judgment reiv 
mg on boundary bv acquiescence to quiet 
title to a 52 5- by 118-foot parcel oi real 
property m the city of Provo The issues 
are whether a showing of uncertaintv or 
dispute on the location of a boundarv line is 
necessarv to the application of boundarv bv 
acquiescence ana if bo what is meant bv 
"uncertainty ana who has the Duraen of 
proving it 
The property m issue is locatec m Provo 
City and is shown as parcel A-B-C-D on 
the accompanvmg map From 1930 to the 
present, there has been a fence along lines 
E-A-B-F It extends approximately 52 
feet behind the rear property lines (C-D) of 
lots 1 and 2 This extension apparently 
resulted from an assumption that tne 231-
foot depth of these lots was measured from 
the edge of the street instead of from the 
points across 100 South Street shown on 
the legal aescnptions 
The fence was clearly visible when the 
Bigelow s purchased lot 1 m 1947 and when 
Cluff acquired lot 2 in 1948 The Halla-
days acquired lot 3, which contains most of 
the disputed parcel, in 1958 (They pur-
chased lot 5 m 1950 and lot 4 in 1961) 
When the Bigelows and Cluff purchased 
lots 1 and 2, they assumed their properties 
extended to the back fence at line A-B 
Acting accordingly, they cultivated gardens 
and built and maintained several chicken 
coops on their respective portions of parcel 
A-B-C-D Bigelows had a survey made in 
1956 that placed their rear boundary near 
line C-D, but they and Cluff apparentlv 
believed the survev to be erroneous In 
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1975 Cluff obtained a plat that placed her During the period of their adiommg proi> 
rear boundary at line C-D ert\ ou nersnip the Hallada\ s maintained 
tnat Bigelow^ and Cluff s true 
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x * i 
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i 
F: 
Map not drawn 
to scale 
: fence 
100 SOUTH STREET 
boundanes were at line OD Mr Halla-
day informed Mr Bigelow of this fact on 
one occasion in the 1950s and told him not 
to use the disputed parcel on several occa-
sions m the 1970s Halladays had no dis-
cussions with Cluff regarding the property 
line until shortly before this litigation com 
menced Halladays made very little use of 
lot 3 
In 1979, the Halladays commenced this 
suit to quiet title to parcel A-B-C-D The 
Bigelows and Cluff counterciaimed and the 
distnct court sustained their ownership of 
this parcel under the doctrine of boundan 
by acquiescence On appeal the Halladavs 
3eek to overturn that decision on the basis 
that boundary by acquiescence cannot be 
applied where there was no dispute or un 
certainty concerning the location of the 
boundary We agree and reverse ^ith di 
rections to quiet title m the Halladays the 
record owners 
HALLADA^ ^ CLIFF 
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I UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE AS 
^ \ INGREDIENT IN BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The doctrine of boundary bv acquies-
cence has been the source of considerable 
confusion and controvers\ among juages 
lawyers, and landowners in this state 
Kino i Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135 139, 378 
P2d 893 895 (1963), Note Boundary by 
Acquiescence, 3 Utah LRe\ 504, 504 
(1953) See generally Note, Boundaries 
bv Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 
1975 Utah L Rev 221 One of the primary 
areas of confusion is the requirement of 
the ' presence or absence of dispute and/or 
uncertainty as to boundary" King v 
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d at 139, 378 P 2d at 895 
[1] Much of the confusion has resulted 
from the intermingling of rules governing 
boundary oy acquiescence and boundary by 
parol agreement Annot., 7 A L R 4th 53, 
59 (1981) Both of these doctrines identify 
circumstances in ^hich landowners can es-
tablish boundary lines without a written 
agreement Originally the two \* ere easih 
distinguishable because boundary b\ parol 
agreement required an express parol 
agreement with respect to a boundan7 but 
no period of acquiescence, while bounaan 
b\ acquiescence reauired a lengthv period 
of acquiescence but no express parol agree-
ment Hummel v Young, 1 Utah 2d 237 
239-40, 265 P 2d 410 411 (1953), Brown v 
Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P 2d 202, 
207 (1951), Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev , supra, 
at 224 1 
With time, the distinctions between 
boundary by agreement and boundary by 
acquiescence became blurred. The require-
ment of an express parol agreement began 
to be articulated among the elements of 
boundary by acquiescence, although this 
Court said that "the law will imply an 
agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts 
1. The period of acquiescence required for 
boundary by acquiescence has not been quanti 
fied into an exact period of time, it depends on 
the circumstances of the particular case This 
Courts most recent discussion identifies it as a 
"long period of time generalK related to the 
common law prescriptive period of 20 years, 
appearing Hummel i Young 1 
Utah 2d at 240 265 P 2d at 411 Similam, 
the reauirement of a long period of acqui-
escence was applied to boundan by agree-
ment Hobson v Panguitch Lake Corp, 
Utan, 530 P 2d 792 794(1975) Blanchard 
z Smith 123 Utah 119, 121, 255 P 2d 729, 
730 (1953) In various opinions the Court 
even referred to boundary b\ agreement 
and boundary by acquiescence as if they 
had merged into one See eg, Hobson v 
Panguitch Lake Corp, 530 P2d at 794 
(reference to "the doctrine of boundan by 
acquiescence or agreement"), Carter i 
Lindner 23 Utah 2d 204, 460 P2d 830 
(1969) (reference to "boundan line b\ ac-
quiescence under an oral agreement"), 
Note, 1975 Utah L Rev , supra, at 222-23 
The confusion stemming from the inter-
mingling of boundan by agreement and 
boundan' by acquiescence has carried over 
to the subject of uncertainty or dispute 
over the boundan Ongmallv, this was 
mentioned as a requirement only m connec-
tion with boundary by agreement Ry-
dalch v Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 109 107 P 
25, 29 (1910) In that context, uncertainty 
or dispute over the boundan would pre-
cede and provide the motivation for the 
oral agreement In 1928, this Court began 
to refer to uncertainty or dispute as a 
matter to be considered m boundan h\ 
acquiescence Tripp i Bagley, 74 Utan 
57, 66-72, 276 P 912 916-18 (1928! 
Thereafter, the opinions of this Court fre-
quent!} referred to a showing of uncertam-
tv or dispute as an essential ingredient m 
the application of the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence Madsen v Clegg, Utah, 
639 P 2d 726, 728-29 (1981), Leon v Dan-
sie, Utah, 639 P 2d 730, 731 (1981), Wright 
v Clissold, Utah, 521 P2d 1224, 1226 
(1974), Universal Investment Corp i 
Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 37-38 484 P 2d 
173, 174-75 (1971), Glenn v Whitney, 116 
and onl\ under unusual circumstances would a 
lesser period be deemed sufficient' Hobson v 
Panguitch Lake Corp Ltah 530 P 2d 792 795 
(1975) (10 vears held insufficient) Accord King 
v Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 141-42, 378 P 2d 893, 
897 (1963) 
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Utah 267. 272-73. 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949); 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley. 105 
Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943); 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93. 34 
P.2d 697, 698-99 (1934). Although there 
are admittedly some other opinions 
throughout this period that make no men-
tion of a showing of uncertainty or dis-
pute,2 we have concluded from the more 
recent cases and from the clear weight of 
authority that the relevance of this ingredi-
ent is settled in our law. See generally 
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1430, 1501-04 (1930), sup-
plemented in 113 A.L.R. 421, 436 (1938); 12 
Am.Jur.2d Boundaries §§ 78-79, 83, 88 
(1964). 
The difficult issues in respect to uncer-
tainty or dispute as an ingredient in bound-
ary by acquiescence concern the meaning 
of these terms and who has the burden of 
proof. As demonstrated hereafter, our 
opinions have not given consistent answers 
to these questions. The contest is typically 
between interests that are both worthy— 
the desire to confirm boundaries that have 
apparently been recognized on the ground 
over a long period of time and the desire to 
enhance reliance on the property dimen-
sions shown in the county records. The 
law clearly gives precedence to the record 
title, with boundary by acquiescence being 
an exception, but the conditions of that 
exception have not been settled with clarity 
or adhered to with consistency, in part be-
cause of the bewildering variety of factual 
circumstances in which the question arises. 
In general, when survey information is 
reasonably available (such as when reliable 
survey control points are accessible to the 
land and survey costs are not dispropor-
tionate to the value of ,the land) so that it is 
reasonable to expect the parties to locate 
their boundary on the ground by surveys, 
the courts should be less willing to apply 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
2. Eg., Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah, 629 P.2d 
447 (1981); Monroe v. Harper, Utah, 619 P.2d 
323 (1980); Hales v. Frakes, Utah, 600 P.2d 556 
(1979). See also Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah at 
25, 232 P.2d at 207 (uncertainty or dispute char-
acterized as the "fiction" on which boundary7 by 
acquiescence is grounded). 
This reasonable availability of survey infor-
mation obviously varies from place to place 
and from time to time. However, it can be 
said in general that survey information is 
more available and its cost is less likely to 
be disproportionate in relation to the value 
of the land in city and platted areas than in 
rural or wilderness areas. It can also be 
said in general that technological advances 
in survey techniques (as well as in the 
accuracy and accessibility of record title 
information) is tipping the scales toward 
greater reliance on record title information 
and lesser reliance on boundary by acquies-
cence.3 The law should conform to those 
realities. 
II. THE MEANING OF UNCERTAINTY 
OR DISPUTE OVER BOUNDARY 
In some earlier cases, uncertainty or dis-
pute had to be traceable to an objectively 
determinable ambiguity in a deed or sur-
vey, so that the true location of the bound-
ary could not be readily ascertained. Ir 
was not established by proving that neither 
adjoining landowner knew the exact loca-
tion of the boundary, because "lack of 
knowledge as to the location of the true 
boundary is not synonymous with uncer-
tainty." Glenn v. Whitney. 116 Utah at 
273, 209 P.2d at 260; Note. 1975 Utah 
L.Rev.. supra, at 231-32. However, later 
cases rejected this objective measurement 
in favor of a subjective test in which "a 
boundary line may be 'uncertain' or in 
dispute' even though it is capable of being 
readily ascertained." Ekberg v. Bates. 121 
Utah 123, 127, 239 P.2d 205. 207 (1951), 
quoting Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 
Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946). 
Uncertainty or dispute was much easier to 
prove under this rule, which therefore had 
the effect of increasing the availability of 
3. When boundary by acquiescence was first in-
troduced in Utah almost a century ago, Swiizga-
ble v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1887), 
much of the state had not been surveyed and 
searches of record title may have been difficult 
to conduct. 
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boundary by acquiescence and decreasing 
reliance on the record title 
[2] After carefully considering our pre-
vious decisions on this question, we return 
to the more rigorous definition set forth m 
Glenn v. Whitney, supra, and hold that 
"dispute" is not proved by a mere differ-
ence of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not 
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge 
of the true location of the boundary. This 
is the thrust of our recent decisions on this 
subject, e.g., Madsen v. Clegg, supra, and 
it is the holding of the better-reasoned 
cases in other jurisdictions. E.g., Buza v. 
Wojtaleuncz, 48 Wis.2d 557, 564-67, 180 
K.W.2d 556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v. 
Witte. 59 Wis. 285, 298-300. 18 N.W. 175, 
180-81 (1884), Fry v. Smith. 91 Idaho 740, 
741-42, 430 P.2d 486. 487-88 (1967). Final-
ly, the ingredient that has been called "dis-
pute or uncertainty" should be measured 
against an objective test of reasonableness 
and should therefore more appropriately be 
called "objective uncertainty." 
[3] Under the rule as we have defined it 
here, the property line shown on the record 
title cannot be displaced by another bound-
ary unless it is shown that during the peri-
od of acquiescence there was some objec-
tively measurable circumstance in the 
record title or m the reasonably available 
survey information (or other technique by 
which record title information was located 
on the ground) that would have prevented 
a landowner, as a practical matter, from 
being reasonably certain about the true 
location of the boundary. By the same 
token, a claimant cannot assert boundary 
by acquiescence if he or his'predecessors in 
title had reason to know the true location 
of the boundary during the period of acqui-
escence. 
Our decision to measure compliance with 
the requirement of "objective uncertainty" 
by whether the landowner, as a practical 
matter, could be reasonably certain about 
the true location of the boundary on the 
ground is supported by two policy consider-
ations. 
First, by allowing less latitude for bound-
ary by acquiescence, we minimize conflict 
with the objectives of our statute of frauds, 
which forbids the transfer of interests m 
real property without a written convey-
ance. U.C.A., 1953. § 25-5-1; Madsen v. 
Clegg, 639 P.2d at 728-29; Tripp v. Bag-
ley, 74 Utah at 68-72, 276 P. at 916-18. 
Second, an objective test, which minimiz-
es reliance on boundary by acquiescence, 
corresponds more closely to the purposes 
of that doctrine. This Court has recog-
nized that "[t]he very reason for being of 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
or agreement is .. [to avoid] stirring up 
controversy." Hobson v. Panguitch Lake 
Corp., 530 P.2d at 794, to prevent litiga-
tion, and to promote repose of title and 
stability m boundaries. Hates v. Frakes. 
600 P 2d at 559. These purposes are best 
furthered if those who purchase, use. or 
sell real property must rely on descriptions 
in deeds and reasonably available survey 
information to settle boundary questions m 
the first instance. Only when it is not 
reasonable to expect landowners to ascer-
tain the true location of the boundary by 
this manner should landowners be allowed 
to claim boundary by acquiescence. See 
Hartung v. Witte. 59 Wis. at 298-300, 18 
N.W. at 180-81. Allowing a claimant to 
forego reasonably available means of de-
termining the true boundary and to assert 
his lack of "actual knowledge" as a basis 
for boundary by acquiescence fosters un-
certainty on the location of boundaries and 
magnifies the number of instances in which 
landowners have to resolve disputes by liti-
gation. 
[4] Boundary by acquiescence remains 
a viable means of establishing a boundary 
where there is objective uncertainty in the 
location of the true boundary that cannot 
reasonably be resolved by reference to the 
record title and by use of reasonably avail-
able survey information. For example, fol-
lowing are instances of objectively measur-
able uncertainties in which boundary by 
acquiescence would be appropriate if its 
other requirements were met: inability to 
locate monuments established in original 
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survey, Holmes v. Judge. 31 Utah 269, 271, 
87 P. 1009. 1010 (1906); internal inconsist-
encies in plat. Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 
229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910): no offi-
cial or original plat or survey by which the 
boundary line can be located, Jensen v. 
Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60. 286 P.2d 804, 
806 (1955); disagreement among different 
surveyors on location of boundary line, id.; 
landmarks referenced in deeds have disap-
peared, Joaquin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84 
Cal.App.3d 192, 148 Cal.Rptr. 495, 496 
(1978); uncertainties or disputes created by 
conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlap-
ping descriptions, Motzkus v. Carroll 7 
Utah 2d 237, 239, 322 P.2d 391, 393 (1958); 
or metes and bounds descriptions that do 
not close, Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 
105, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962). 
Boundary by acquiescence should also be 
available where there are other inconsisten-
cies that create reasonable doubt in the 
meaning of the record title or in its applica-
tion to the actual on-the-ground location of 
the property identified in the record.4 
III. BURDEN OF PROOF OF 
OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
An early line of cases placed the burden 
of proving uncertainty or dispute on the 
party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah at 93-94, 34 
P.2d at 698-99; Home Owners' Loan 
Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah at 219-20, 141 
P.2d at 166; Willie v. Local Realty Co., 
110 Utah at 530-32, 175 P.2d at 722-23; 
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at 272-73, 209 
P.2d at 260. For example, since the fence 
in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 
supra, "was not shown to have been estab-
lished to settle any dispute or to establish 
any boundary line, the true location of 
which was unknown or even uncertain," 
boundary by acquiescence wTas held to have 
failed. 105 Utah at 219, 141 P.2d at 166. 
A few years later, however, in Brown v. 
Milliner, supra, this Court rejected the 
ruling in this line of cases, stating: 
4. Parties also remain free to settle uncertainties 
or disputes through boundary by agreement or 
by the use of quitclaim deeds or other legal 
In some of the opinions of this court on 
the subject of disputed boundaries, there 
are statements to the effect that the 
location of the true boundary must be 
uncertain, unknown or in dispute before 
an agreement between the adjoining 
landowners fixing the boundary will be 
upneld, citing Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in 
support thereof But the Tripp case 
does not require a party relying upon a 
boundary which has been acquiesced in 
for a long period of time to produce 
evidence that the location of the true 
boundary was ever unknown, uncertain 
or in dispute. That the true boundary-
was uncertain or in dispute and that the 
parties agreed upon the recognized 
boundary as the dividing line will be im-
plied from the parties' long acquiescence. 
120 Utah at 27, 232 P.2d at 208. Numer-
ous decisions after Brown v. Milliner used 
a similar approach, either by omitting this 
subject from the list of elements to estab-
lish the doctrine or by requiring the defend-
ing landowner to prove "the absence of a 
dispute or uncertainty in fixing the bound-
ary" as a means of rebutting a presump-
tion of boundary by acquiescence. Wright 
v. Clissold, 521 P.2d at 1226. See. e.g.. 
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury, 
26 Utah 2d at 37, 484 P.2d at 174; King v. 
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d at 138. 378 P.2d at 895; 
Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d at 242-43, 
322 P.2d at 395-96. 
However, in Florence v. Hiline Equip-
ment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this 
Court was again squarely faced with the 
question of who should carry the burden of 
proof. In holding that boundary by acqui-
escence did not apply, the trial court had 
stated as a conclusion of law "[t]hat the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
arises only when the true boundary is ei-
ther unknown, uncertain, or in dispute, 
none of which was proved in this case." 
Id. at 1000. The Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Hall (only one justice 
dissenting), affirmed that decision and its 
documents. Disputants may also acquire prop-
erty through adverse possession, as provided by 
statute. §§ 78-12-2 to -21. 
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statement of the law, noting that it was 
"consistent with this Court's prior hold-
ings." Id. The Florence holding wras ap-
parently ignored (but not questioned) in 
three subsequent cases.5 Then, in reject-
ing boundary by acquiescence, our two 
most recent cases discuss the absence of 
uncertainty or dispute in conjunction with 
the affirmative requirements of the doc-
trine and contain no intimation that this 
subject is part of the burden of a record 
landowner seeking to rebut a presumption. 
Icon v. Dansie, Utah. 639 P.2d 730 (1981); 
Madsen v. Ciegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981). 
In the latter case, this Court stated: "In 
the absence of any initial uncertainty 
concerning the ownership of the property 
in question, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence has no application." Id. at 
729 (emphasis added). 
The question of burden of proof is about 
evenly balanced on the authorities. On 
policy, both positions are supportable by 
persuasive arguments. The allocation of 
the burden of proof could therefore depend 
on what one assumes about whether it is 
the record owner or the claimant by acqui-
escence who has superior access to facts 
about events long past, but that basis of 
decision is unacceptable because either as-
sumption could be made and neither could 
be justified empirically. In this circum-
stance, we are especially well advised to 
limit our rule of law to the facts before us. 
[5,6] This case involves property in the 
city of Provo, where survey information is 
readily available. It is therefore reason-
able for the law to require the parties in 
this case to locate their property lines on 
the ground by means of the record title and 
reasonably available survey information 
rather than by acquiescence in a fence line 
or other identifiable points on the ground. 
Consequently, as to this circumstance we 
5. These cases, cited note 2 supra, do not list 
uncertainty or dispute as an affirmative require-
ment of boundary by acquiescence. 
6. We express no opinion on whether this alloca-
tion of the burden of proof would apply to 
property not located in a city or platted area. 
hold that the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence has the burden of proving 
objective uncertainty as part of the prima 
facie elements of the doctrine of boundary7 
by acquiescence.6 Notwithstanding this al-
location of the burden of proof, the record 
landowner may, of course, conclusively ne-
gate the existence of objective uncertainty 
by proving that the claimant or his prede-
cessors in title had reason to knowT the 
location of the true boundary before the 
expiration of the period of acquiescence. 
IV. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
We are mindful that the district court 
had to rule on the facts of this case in the 
face of the contradictory authorities we 
have discussed. Since we have now under-
taken to clarify the rules pertaining to this 
case, our task is much easier. 
[7] Although there are no direct find-
ings relating to the requirement of uncer-
tainty, the court did find that "[t]here is no 
record title in either [the Bigelows or Cluff] 
to the property in dispute." Neither of 
these claimants challenges the factual ba-
sis for that finding. In addition, there is no 
evidence of any objectively measureabie cir-
cumstance in the record title or in the rea-
sonably available survey information that 
would have prevented the claimants from 
using these means to ascertain the true 
boundary on the ground. On the contrary, 
the evidence clearly shows that both claim-
ants had ready access to deeds and had 
actually examined surveys clearly estab-
lishing the Halladays' record title to the 
property in dispute. Consequently, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is 
inapplicable as a matter of law in the cir-
cumstances of this case. The decree rely-
ing on that doctrine in quieting the claim-
ants' title to parcel A-B-OD must there-
fore be reversed.7 
7. Our resolution of this issue makes it logically 
unnecessary for us to rule on the other issues 
tendered by appellants. 
We also forego answering the numerous argu-
ments and charges in the dissenting opinion. 
We do caution that the meaning and intent of 
this opinion should not be judged by the content 
of the dissent, because we do not acquiesce in 
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The decree is re\ersed and the case is 
remanded to the district court for the efltrv 
of a new decree m conformitv with this 
opinion No costs awarded 
HALL CJ and STEWART ana DUR 
HAM JJ concur 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent 
mg) 
I concur m the result on the limited 
ground that both the Bigelow*; and the 
Cluffs who rely on boundary by acquies 
cence had actually examined surveys dur 
ing the penod of acquiescence showing the 
Halladay s ownership of the propertv m 
dispute Once the\ examined the surveys 
they had reason to knovv that the line ac 
quiesced in was not the true line and they 
could acquire no rights thereafter In 
Tripp i Bagley, 74 I tan 57 276 P 912 
(1928) this Court held the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence to be not applica-
ble because the evidence affirmatively dem 
onstrated that when the boundarv fence 
was erected the parties knevv that it was 
not on the true line and further the\ could 
not have believed it to be on the true line 
since the true line vvas straight north and 
south along a section line whereas the 
boundary fence had angle turns m it like a 
dog's leg This requirement was again rec 
ognized m Willie % Local Realty Co 110 
Utah 523 175 P 2d 718 (1946) More re 
cently, in Florence i Hihne Equipment 
Co, Utah 581 P2d 998 (1978) this Court in 
holding the doctrine of boundary by acqui-
escence not applicable noted that both the 
joining owners knew w here the true bound-
ary was located and thus they did not treat 
a fence which ran between their properties 
as marking the boundary Similarly m 
Madsen v Clegg, Utah, 639 P 2d 726 (1981), 
we stressed the fact that the fence running 
between the two properties ran m a 
strfc\ght l\i\%, whereas the parties deed 
the dissent s interpretation of this opinion To 
cite only one example a boundarv located on a 
surveyed line could quahfv for boundarv b\ 
acquiescence even though a subsequent surve\ 
showed the original survev to have been in 
error A rule of law that is intended to encour 
age landowners to relv on record title mforma 
lines which coincided along this course had 
two right angle turns in them In all of 
these decisions the parties had reason to 
know that the acquiesced line was not the 
true line or that fact was implicit The 
doctrine of boundary b\ acquiescence was 
held m each case to be not applicable 
I regard most of the balance of the ma 
jontv opinion to be dicta and an unwarrant-
ed assault upon boundary by acquiescence 
as it has been developed by the cases of 
this Court over the past 80 years I dis 
sent from much of it especially from the 
announcement that boundary b\ acquies-
cence should be further restricted and not 
applied where the adjoining land owners 
could have or should have had their proper 
ties surveved before the boundary was 
marked on the ground I cannot subscnbe 
to that announcement for the following 
reasons 
The doctrine of boundan by acquies 
cence has aiwa\s been very restricts ely 
applied Since it operates to taKe from the 
fee owner a small strip of his land it has 
never been given broad application Only 
in those exceptional circumstances where 
all four of the following elements were 
present has it been employed (1) occupa 
tion up to a visible line marked by monu-
ments fences or buildings (2) mutual ac 
quiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) 
for a long period of time (4) by adjoining 
land owners Goodman i Wilkinson 
I tan 629 P 2d 447 (1981) Since the doc-
trine was first announced in Holmes i 
Judge 31 Utah 269 87 P 1009 (1906), it 
has been applied onh m approximately 25 
cases reaching this Court (see appendix) 
The effect of the announcement by the 
majority opinion is to sub silentio overrule 
most of those cases In a thoughtful and 
wrell-considered opinion written by Justice 
Fnck of this Court m Holmes v Judge, 
supra, \t Vv2ts pomte^l out that the tacxrvne 
tion and reasonabh available surve\ informa 
tion will not be applied to penalize a landowner 
who has done just that If the original surve\ 
was in error that is a clear instance of objective 
uncertainrv and boundar\ b\ acauiescence will 
appiv if its other elements are proved 
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0f boundary by acquiescence rests upon 
sound public policy; that it was a doctrine 
of repose with the view of quieting titles 
and preventing strife and litigation con-
cerning boundaries. Many years later. Jus-
tice Crockett in Hobson i. Panguitch Lake 
Corp., Utah, 530 P.2d 792 (1975), endorsed 
this same public policy when he said: 
That in the interest of preserving the 
peace and good order of society (sic) the 
quietly resting bones of the past, which 
no one seems to have been troubled or 
complained about for a long period of 
vears, should not be unearthed for the 
purpose of stirring up controversy, but 
should be left in their repose. 
Now the majority seems to say that this 
iong recognized public policy should be 
abandoned; that the bones of the past may 
be unearthed and controversy permitted if 
when the boundary was marked on the 
ground (by fences, trees, etc.) 30, 40 or 50 
vears ago it was feasible for the then own-
ers to have surveyed their properties which 
supposedly would have resulted in the 
placement of the boundary on the deed line. 
There are three major difficulties with that 
approach. In the first place, a survey may 
have been actually made and the boundary 
marked on that line. Because of the lapse 
of many years, no one who was then 
present may be alive or available. Just 
because a recent survey shows the marked 
boundary to be incorrectly placed does not 
prove that the then owners, many years 
ago, did not have a survey made on which 
they relied in establishing the marked 
boundary. As finer and more precise in-
struments of survey are developed, proper-
ty lines established in accordance with ear-
lier surveys may often be shown to be out 
of place by later surveys. Under the rule 
adopted by the majority, apparently the 
later survey would govern and a marked 
boundary which may well have been estab-
lished in reliance on the earlier survey 
would yield. In Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz. 
99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950), the Court emphati-
cally rejected such a suggestion and quoted 
with approval the following statement ap-
pearing in a Michigan case, Diehl v. Zan-
ger, 39 Mich. 601 (1878): 
Nothing is better understood than that 
few of our early plats will stand the test 
of a careful and accurate survey without 
disclosing errors. This is as true of the 
government surveys as of any others, 
and if all the lines were now subject to 
correction on new surveys, the confusion 
of lines and titles that would follow 
would cause consternation in many com-
munities. Indeed, the mischiefs that 
must follow would be simply incalcula-
ble, and the visitation of the surveyor 
might well be set down as a great public 
calamity. But no law can sanction this 
course. 
The majority assures us that a new survey 
would not necessarily be allowed to upset a 
boundary set on an earlier survey. But 
after the lapse of many years, no one may 
know that an earlier survey was made. 
Thus, the later survey will be followed and 
the boundary, long recognized, will be 
moved. 
Secondly, the boundary dispute is here 
and now. It does little good to reflect as to 
what the then owners 30, 40 or 50 years 
ago might have done and disregard entirely 
the conduct of the owners and their succes-
sors since that time in acquiescing in the 
markers on the ground. In most cases, the 
acquiescence is an unconscious act with no 
thought being given during the period of 
acquiescence to the boundary, let alone 
with surveying it. Thirdly, this Court 
should not embark upon the impossible 
task of trying to determine in each case 
whether the owners 30. 40 or 50 years ago 
could have afforded a survey had they then 
given thought to the boundary or whether 
the value of the property at that time 
would have been worth it, depending upon 
whether the boundary dispute arises "in 
city and platted areas" or whether it arises 
in "rural or wilderness areas." The an-
swers to such inquiries will he impossible 
to obtain. The inquiry apparently will be 
subjective. Yet in many cases the builders 
of the marked boundary will be dead or will 
have long since sold their interest in the 
property and be unavailable. Our cases on 
boundary by acquiescence for the past 80 
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vears have approached boundan disputes 
with the view that it is not unjust in certain 
cases to require disputing owners to live 
with what the> and their predecessors have 
acquiesced m for a long period of time 
Today the majontv turns its back on that 
philosoph} and now wants to explore and 
decide boundary cases on what might have 
been This approach is not practical and I 
believe will prove to be unworkable 
Holmes i Judge supra, and its progeny 
have been consistent in rejecting the notion 
that boundary by acquiescence should onh 
be applied when the true line could not 
have been ascertained bv a survey This 
contention was put to rest m an earlier 
case, Young v Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 
P 1124 (1910) Two years later, in Bin-
ford v Eccles, 41 Utah 453, 126 P 333 
(1912), Chief Justice Fnck again dismissed 
that contention in the following words 
Appellant would thus be permitted to 
unsettle boundaries whidh by the adjoin-
ing land owners had been recognized and 
acquiesced in for approximate!} a quar-
ter of a centur} Any rule oflau which 
would permit such a result would be 
pernicious and in the long run would 
produce strife and litigation, and in 
the nature of things would often result 
in injustice if not oppression [Empha-
sis added] 
More recently in Willie i Local Realty 
Co, supra and in Ekberg i Bates 121 
Utah 123, 239 P2d 205 (1951), this Court 
again rejected the suggestion that bound-
ary by acquiescence should not apply un-
less it could be demonstrated that the true 
line could not be ascertained b\ a survey 
The majority advocates that we "return" 
and now follow an obscure statement made 
m Glenn i Whitney, 1LB Utah 267, 209 
P2d 257 (1949), that "lack of knowledge as 
to the location of the true boundary is not 
synonymous with uncertainty " The sub-
ject of surveying wras not discussed in that 
case and it is this writer's opinion that that 
statement does not refer to surveying 
However, if that statement means that 
there can be no uncertainty in the absence 
of a survey, it is out of harmonv with every 
other case of this Court on the subject and 
should be summanlv disavowed The 
statement was dicta since the evidence 
showed that the person who had erected 
the old fence did not own land on either 
side of it and boundan bv acquiescence 
clearlv did not applv 
In a surprising turnabout in thinking and 
public policy, the majontv opinion now pro-
claims that the stirring up of controversy is 
avoided litigation is prevented and repose 
of title and stability m boundaries is pro-
moted if "those who purchase, use or sell 
real property may rely on descnptions m 
deeds and reasonably available surve} in-
formation to settle boundary questions m 
the first instance" As I have already 
pointed out generally reliance on descnp-
tions m deeds and available survey infor-
mation is salutarv However m those rare 
instances where the elements of bounoarv 
bv acquiescence are present an exception 
has been recognized ano disputing neigh-
bors are not permitted to depart from that 
which they have long acquiesced m This 
does no mischief to those who purchase, 
use or sell real propem as the majonu 
opinion maintains since it is not unfair to 
charge buyers with taking notice of a 
marked boundary which is there to be seen 
m plain sight Boundary by acquiescence 
cases often anse when one adjoining land 
owner decides to sell his propem and a 
survey is made bv him or his buyer reveal-
ing that the marked boundarv encroaches a 
few inches or sometimes a few feet Rath-
er than disturbing the long acquiesced in 
boundary, the law has been and is that the 
boundary shall not be disturbed but the 
buyer ma\ protect himself b} requiring a 
reduction m the purchase pnce by the ven-
dor to compensate for the shortage of prop-
erty If fortuitously the survey shows that 
the seller has an excess of property, the 
buyer reaps the bargain of it Either wav 
*he old boundary is preserved and stnie 
and litigation is prevented No innocent 
person is harmed Only that owner who 
has slept on his nghts is made to live with 
that which he has long accepted 
I dissent from many statements made m 
part I of the majontv opinion First proof 
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0f uncertainty or dispute is not and has 
never been an ' ingredient' or element of a 
cause of action for boundary bv acquies-
cence Tripp i Bagley supra cited by the 
majontv does not so hold Uncertainty and 
dispute were discussed in that case m con-
nectior with an express parol boundary 
agreement where it must be proved to 
overcome the bar of the statute of frauds 
The part} reiving on the oral agreement 
must show that the location of true bound-
ary was unknown uncertain or disputed 
*hen the agreement was made, otherwise 
the orai agreement is invalid as an attempt 
bv the contracting parties to transfer own-
ership of real estate without a writing 
Tne plaintiff in that case also relied upon 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
but this Court held it to be not applicable 
for the reasons already stated m the first 
paragraph of this ODimon viz. when the 
bounaarv fence was erected the parties 
knew that it was not on tne true line be-
cause of its angle turns The Court did not 
hold that a party relying upon boundary by 
acquiescence had to affirmatively show7 
that the boundary was erected following 
uncertainty or dispute Such a require-
ment would be entirely foreign to the doc-
trine of boundary by acquiescence because 
the basis of the doctrine is that the law 
implies that there once existed uncertainty 
and dispute and that the adjoining owners 
mutually agreed upon the marked bound-
ary ir settlement Holmes v Judge, supra 
If there was ever any question about this 
proposition our opinion m Brown v Milli-
ner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P 2d 202 (1951), 
decided many years after Tripp v Bagley, 
supra, clarified that matter and put it to 
rest 
In some of the opinions, of the court on 
the subject of disputed boundaries, there 
are statements to the effect that the 
location of the true boundary must be 
uncertain, unknown or m dispute before 
an agreement betw een the adjoining land 
owners fixing the boundary will be up-
held citing Tripp i Bagley, supra, m 
support thereof Such statements 
should be understood to mean that if the 
location of the true boundary line is 
known to the adjoining owners thev can-
not by parol agreement establish the 
boundary elsewhere As was pointed 
out m the Tripp case, such an agreement 
would be in contravention of the statute 
of frauds But the Tripp case does not 
require a partv reiving upon a boundary 
which has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time to produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary was 
ever unknown, uncertain or m dispute 
That the true boundary was uncertain or 
m dispute and that the parties agreed 
upon the recognized boundary as the di-
viding line will be implied from the par-
ties' long acquiescence Roberts v Brae, 
5 Cal 2d 356, 54 P 2d 698 In Holmes v 
Judge supra, this court, speaking 
through Mr Justice Fnck, set forth the 
following requirements necessary to es-
tabhsn a boundan by acquiescence The 
line must be open visible marked by 
monuments fences or buildings and rec-
ognized as the boundary for a long term 
of years It was expressly stated by the 
court m that case that there was no 
evidence how the fence and building 
which were recognized as the boundary 
came to be erected, or that there was 
ever any dispute between the adjoining 
owners concerning the location of the 
true boundan or that any question was 
ever raised as to its location until shortly 
before the plaintiff commenced his ac-
tion 
This explanation was again set out m haec 
verba m Motzkus v Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 
237, 322 P 2d 391 (1958) where we express-
ly rejected the contention that the party 
relying on the long recognized boundary 
must prove that it was once unknown, un-
certain or in dispute Justice Wade, writ-
ing for the Court, stated 
[I]t is clear that where a party by evi-
dence establishes a long period of acqui-
escence in a fence as marking the bound-
ary line between two tracts, he is not 
required to also produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary line 
was ever unknowTn, uncertain or in dis 
pute The establishment of a long period 
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of acquiescence in a fence as marking 
the boundary line between two tracts by 
the respective owners gives rise to a 
presumption that the true boundary line 
was in dispute or uncertain, which 
places, at least the burden of producing 
evidence that there was no dispute or 
uncertainty but that the true boundary 
line was known to the respective owners 
on the party claiming that such was the 
fact. Where, as here, there is evidence 
on that question other than the proof of 
acquiescence in the fence as marking the 
boundary line for the required long peri-
od of time the trial court must find that 
the boundary line by acquiescence has 
been established. 
(Emphasis added.) Justice Wade cited as 
his authority Brown v. Milliner, supra, 
which in turn relied on the original acquies-
cence case, Holmes v. Judge, supra. 
In view of the foregoing unequivocal pro-
nouncements of this Court, I cannot agree 
with the majority that "we have concluded 
from the more recent cases and from the 
clear weight of authority that the relevance 
of this ingredient [uncertainty and dispute] 
is settled in our law." None of the cases 
cited by the majority in support of that 
statement do in fact so hold.1 
The majority opinion in the face of 80 
years of cases to the contrary also places 
the burden of proof that an uncertainty or 
dispute once existed upon the party relying 
1. The cases cited by the majority make only the 
briefest mention of uncertainty and dispute; 
none of them hold that the party advocating 
boundary by acquiescence must prove as an 
element of his cause of action that the fence, 
etc. was erected because of uncertainty or dis-
pute by the adjoining land owners. For exam-
ple, in Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 
(1981), Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 
P.2d 257 (1949), Homeowners Loan Corp. v. 
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 ?2d 160 (1943), and 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 
(1934) it appears to this writer that uncertainty 
and dispute was mentioned as an element of an 
express parol agreement; most of those cases 
cite Tripp v. Bagley, supra, which gives credence 
to my interpretation. In two other cases cited 
by the majority, Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521 
P.2d 1224 (1974), and Universal Investment Corp. 
v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 
(1971), it was stated that lack of any uncertainty 
upon the old established boundary. By so 
doing, one of the foundations of the doc-
trine is destroyed, viz., that the law im-
plies that the landowners were once uncer-
tain or in dispute and the boundary was 
marked on the ground in settlement. 
Holmes v. Judge, supra. This implication 
is drawn because due to the passage of 
time, there is often little or no evidence 
available as to the erection of the boundary 
marker. Without being able to rely on the 
implication, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence cannot continue to exist as a 
workable and viable doctrine. Our cases 
have recognized that lack of uncertainty or 
dispute can be raised as a defense against 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
by the person assailing the old boundary7. 
Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224 
(1974). Motzkus v. Carroll supra, and 
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury, 
26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly 
held that like other defenses the burden of 
proof is upon the person asserting the de-
fense. We explained in our opinion in 
Wright v. Clissold, supra, that once the 
four elements of boundary by acquiescence 
(named above) are established, the Court is 
required to presume the existence of a 
binding agreement unless the party who 
assails it proves by competent evidence 
that there was actually no agreement be 
tween the adjoining land owners or there 
could not have been a proper agreement. 
Said the Court: 
or dispute at the time the fence was erected 
could be shown as a defense by the party resist-
ing boundarv by acquiescence. In Leon v. Dan-
sie, Utah, 639 >.2d 730 (1981). "dispute" was 
mentioned not as a requirement but "that there 
had been no dispute as to record title [not as to 
the location of the boundary] at any time over 
the years." In most of the above cases the 
mention of uncertainty and dispute was dicta 
since the case was decided on other grounds. 
For example, in Leon v. Dansie, Wright v. Clis-
sold and Glen v. Whitney, the fence was shown 
to have been erected not as a boundary but 
simply to contain livestock. Similarly, in Glenn 
v. Whitney, the person erecting the fence did not 
own land on either side of it; in Homeowners 
Loan Corp. v. Dudley the same person owned 
the land on both sides of the fence and in 
Peterson v. Johnson the land on one side of the 
fence was in the public domain. 
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Facts which prove the latter include the 
following:: (1) no parties available to 
make an agreement, e.g., sole ownership 
of the property with the existing line 
which was later transferred in tracts to 
two or more other persons; (2) the line 
was set for a purpose other than setting 
a boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute 
or uncertainty in fixing the boundary; 
and (4) . . . 
I disagree with the majority opinion that 
some of our cases have placed the burden 
of proof upon the party relying upon 
boundary by acquiescence. My reading of 
the cases cited by the majority indicates 
that who has the burden of proof was not 
an issue in any one of them, and I consider 
the incomplete statements in those cases 
upon which the majority relies to be dicta 
as far as burden of proof is concerned. On 
the other hand, in Motzkus v. Carroll, su-
pra, burden of proof was a vital issue and 
it was there held that the party relying 
upon the old boundary fence is not required 
to produce evidence that the location of the 
true boundary line was ever unknown, un-
certain or in dispute. 
I dissent from the adoption of the rule 
proposed by the majority in Part II that: 
[T]he property line shown on the record 
title cannot be displaced by another 
boundary unless it is shown that during 
the period of acquiescence there was 
some objectively measurable circum-
stance in the record title or in the reasona-
bly available survey information (or other 
technique by which record title informa-
tion was located on the ground) that 
would have prevented a landowner as a 
practical matter from ,being reasonably 
certain about the true location of the 
boundary. By the same token a claimant 
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence 
if he or his predecessors in title had 
reason to know the true location of the 
boundary during the period of acquies-
cence. 
I am in accord with the second sentence. 
The instant case provides an illustration of 
that rule, viz., during the period of acquies-
cence, Bigelow and Cluff had access to a 
survey which indicated that they did not 
own to the fence to which they claim. 
However, the first sentence quoted above 
seems to be out of harmony with the sec-
ond sentence. It seems to require proof of 
a negative, i.e., proof by the person relying 
on boundary by acquiescence that he and 
his predecessors were prevented for some 
reason from having a survey made which 
would have determined the location of the 
true line. So far as this writer knows only 
the lack of money could really keep any 
land owner from having a survey made. Is 
that now going to be a vital and valid 
inquiry by the Court in future boundary 
cases? 
I believe that a rule which would serve 
us better and which would be workable 
might be simply stated as follows: 
A claimant cannot assert boundary by 
acquiescence if he or his predecessors in 
title during the period of acquiescence 
had reason to know that the boundary 
acquiesced in was not on the true line. 
This "reason to know" could come about 
because of information contained in the 
record title or in existing survey informa-
tion or information from other sources 
which would put a reasonable man on 
notice that the boundary acquiesced in 
was not on the true line. 
Since the reasonable man standard is used 
in other areas of the law I would hope that 
it would work well here. It would provide 
courts with the basis for refusing to apply 
boundary by acquiescence where the dis-
crepancy was apparent and the acquies-
cence was blindly indulged in. On the oth-
er hand, we must not expect too much from 
the rule since being familiar with the legal 
description of one's property and locating 
that description on the land are two entire-
ly different things. That is why surveys 
are made. However, the rule would serve 
well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley, su-
pra, where an old fence line had several 
angle turns in it whereas the true line was 
straight north and south along the section 
line; and in Madsen v. Cleggf supra, where 
the boundary fence ran on a straight line. 
whereas the deed lines of both parties had 
right-angle turns in them. In both cases 
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the landowners had reason to know that 
the fence was not on the true line. 
Part III of the majority opinion ends with 
the observation that because the property 
involved in this case is in the city of Provo 
survey information is readily available and 
it is reasonable for the law to require the 
parties to locate their property lines on the 
ground by means of a survey. It appears 
to me that this statement is out of harmony 
with earlier statements in the opinion 
which indicated that the Court should look 
at the situation as of when the acquies-
cence began to determine whether it was 
feasible for a survey to have been made— 
not 20 years later when this litigation was 
commenced. 
In conclusion, I am concerned that the 
rules laid down by the majority are unclear 
and unworkable as I understand them. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has a proper place in our jurisprudence and 
in my opinion has served well the public 
policy which brought it into existence in the 
first place. It has provided a fair basis for 
settling disputes over often insignificant 
amounts of land and has discouraged 
countless p'roperty owners from feuding 
with their neighbors when a recent survey 
conflicts with long recognized lines. 
Everything the majority argues and now 
espouses was considered and rejected by 
this Court in Holmes v. Judge, supra, when 
Justice Frick wrote: 
While the interests of society require 
that the title to real estate shall not be 
transferred from the owner for slight 
cause, or otherwise than by law, these 
same interests demand that there shall 
be stability in boundaries, and that, 
where parties have 'for a long term of 
years acquiesced in a certain line be-
tween their own and their neighbor's 
property, they will not thereafter be per-
mitted to say that what they permitted to 
appear as being established by and with 
their consent and agreement was in fact 
false. 
For nearly 80 years wre have followed that 
philosophy. But today the majority opinion 
opens the way for any property owrner in 
this state to have now his property sur-
veyed (or resurveyed) and gain possession 
of every inch contained in his legal descrip-
tion. Old surveys and boundaries built in 
reliance thereon will be meaningless. I 
believe that the majority opinion is a step 
backward in achieving stability of bound-
aries in this state. 
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tions; (4) the court can restrict or deny 
access altogether where necessary to as-
sure that a defendant receives a fair tnal 
before an impartial jury; and (5) tnal 
court's closure order failed to qualify for 
the fair trial exception to the constitutional 
right of access, and thus, was invalid, 
where the closure order was not accompa-
nied by written findings, and where no 
evidence was submitted in the hearing on 
the motion for closure. 
Extraordinary writ granted, order clos-
ing preliminary hearing set aside. 
Daniels, District Judge, concurred in 
part and dissented in part and filed an 
opinion in which Howe, J., joined. 
KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION, 
PUBLISHER OF the SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE, Petitioner, 
v. 
Honorable Eleanor S. LEWIS, Circuit 
Court Judge, Respondent. 
No. 19612. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
Newspaper publisher petitioned for an 
extraordinary writ seeking to vacate an 
order of closure and to stay a preliminary 
hearing in a criminal case involving three 
defendants charged with aggravated kid-
napping, aggravated sexual assault, and 
aggravated exploitation. The Supreme 
Court, Oaks, J., denied the stay but called 
for briefs on the merits, and held that: (1) 
publisher's appeal was not moot, despite 
fact that the preliminary hearing had been 
concluded: (2) public's, including the me-
dia's. First Amendment right of access ap-
plies to preliminary hearings in criminal 
cases; (3) the people, including the media, 
have a right of public access to criminal 
trials and preliminary hearings under the 
State Constitution, subject to certain excep-
1. Action c=6 
Newspaper publisher's petition for an 
extraordinary writ to vacate an order clos-
ing a preliminary hearing m a cnminal case 
was not moot, despite fact that the closed 
hearing had been held, in view of fact that 
the case involved a question of considerable 
public interest that would recur and evade 
review unless held to be an exception to the 
mootness doctrine. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
7(d)(2). 
2. Constitutional Law c=>90.1(3) 
Public's, including the media's, First 
Amendment right of access applies to pre-
liminary hearings in criminal cases. U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>238r2) 
At a preliminary examination, prosecu-
tion has burden of introducing sufficient 
evidence to persuade magistrate that there 
is probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it. U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-7(dXH. 
4. Criminal Law <£=*230, 635 
The people, including the news media, 
have a constitutional right of public access 
to criminal trials and preliminary hearings 
under the State Constitution. Const. Art. 
1, §§ 2, 15. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
BIGELOW, 
DECREE 
Civil No. 1,243 
Defendants. 
/ 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 
28th day of August, 198C, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for 
the plaintiffs, M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant 
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants 
Bigelow. The parties presented their evidence and after 
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts 
and the law the Court took the matter under advisement. On 
December 3, 1930, plaintiff brought a motion to reopen for 
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs' 
claim of title. The court granted the motion to reopen and 
received the additional evidence and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters 
the following: 
D E C R E E 
1. Plaintiffs are granted a decree quieting 
title to themselves to the following described property: 
Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; thence 
South 89°00' East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03,17" West 
along a fence line 174.12- feet to the point of beginning. 
Area = 0.04 acres 
2. Defendants Bigelow are granted a decree 
quieting title to themselves in the area described as follows: 
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
7.29 feet; whence North i°00t East 177.60 feet; thence 
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence 
line 177.70 feet to the point of beginning. Area=0.02 Acres 
3. Defendants Cluff and Bigelow are granted 
a decree quieting title in that portion of tract #4 on Exhibits 
8 and 12 cross-hatched in orange, more particularly described 
as follows: 
Commencing 588.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 118.10 
feet; thence North 0°03'17" East along a fence line 55.31 
feet; thence South 89°51'20" East along a fence line 
118.20 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence 
line 55.01 feet to the point of beginning. Area 0.15 Acres 
Dated and signed this 2,^ day of July, 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
George E,' Ballif, Jutige 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Decree 
was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd day of July, 
1981 by placing same in the United States mails, addressed 
as follows: 
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M. DAYLE JEFFS Or JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
Telephone: 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
BIGELOW, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 53,243 
Defendants. 
/ 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 
28th day of August, 1930, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for 
the plaintiffs, II. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant 
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants 
Bigelow. The parties presented their evidence and after 
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts 
and the law the Court took the matter under advisement. On 
December 3, 1980, plaintiff brought a Motion to Reopen for 
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs' 
claim of title. The Court granted the Motion to Reopen and 
received the additional evidence and having fully considered 
the same, now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and plaintiffs predecessors 
in interest have occupied up to the visible boundary fenceline 
in parcel 3 shown on Exhibit #12 and cross-hatched in green, 
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ly ing wi th in the t i t l e of the defendant , Madge Kelson Cluff, 
for many y e a r s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y desc r ibed as fo l lows: 
Commencing 606.35 f ee t West and 319.36 f ee t North from the 
Southeas t corner of Sect ion 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
Eas t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89c0 0' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South S t r e e t , Provo, Utah 
10.36 feet? thence North 1°00' East 174.10 f ee t ; tnence 
South 89 00' Eas t 7.49 f e e t ; thence South 0°03 ,17" West 
along a fence l i n e 174.12 f e e t to the p o i n t of beginning. 
Area = 0.04 ac res 
2. The parties hereto have acquiesced in said 
line as a boundary line for a long period of years as adjoining 
land owners. 
3. The court finds tnat defendants 3igelow and 
their predecessors in interest have occupied that strip of 
land within the legal title of plaintiffs Kalladay on Exhibit 
#12 in parcel 1, which is cross-hatched in brown. The parties 
hereto have acquiesced in said line as a boundary for a long 
period of years by the adjoining land owners. Said parcel is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
7 . 2 9 ' f e e t ; thence North 1° 00' East 177.60 f e e t ; thence 
East 4.67 f e e t ; thence South 0°09 , 25" West along a fence 
l i n e 177.70 f ee t t o the p o i n t of beg inning . Area = 0.02 Acres. 
4. As to the property in controversy between 
the plaintiffs and defendants Cluff and Bigelow shown on 
Exhibit #12, cross-hatched in orange and marked by points 
M-N-O-P, the court finds that: 
(a) The plaintiffs succeeded to a tax 
title to the description outlined in yellow on Exhibit #12 
and marked by points A-B-C-D. Tax title was issued to George 
-2-
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E. Collard by Utah County on the 23rd day of May, 1951 and 
recoraed June 28, 1951 m the office of the Utah County Recorder. 
This document is defendant's Exhibit #27. 
(b) The tax deed is regular on its face. 
(c) The plaintiffs have never occupied 
the area cross-hatched m orange on Exhibits #8 and #12, nor 
the area within the fencelmes identified on Exhibits #8 and 
#12 as points P-M-N-Q. 
(d) The fence between points P-M-N-0 have 
existed for many years. 
5. The fencelme marked P-M-N-0 has marked 
the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow 
and tneir predecessors m interest since before 1948. 
6. The defendants Cluffs and Bigelow and 
their predecessors have built improvements upon the land, 
have occupied it for purpose of farming, storage and business 
operations. 
7. The fencelme M-N has been in existence 
for over 50 years according to the testimony of plaintiffs' 
witnesses. 
8. The only evidence of plaintiffs* asserting a 
claim of ownership and title to the tract in dispute, cross-
hatched in orange, points M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was 
an incident occurring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs' 
asserted title thereto as against defendant Bigelow and 
ordered Bigelow to cease digging a potato cellar thereon. 
Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within the ground to 
which he held legal title, but testified that he did not 
acknowledge plaintiffs' superior right to the land is dis-
pute. 
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9. The court visited the premises and in 
viewing the north boundary of the land in dispute, point 
M-N on Exhibits 8 and 12, observed that there was a well 
developed fencelme and a planted area marking that as the 
area of occupancy as between the plaintiffs' property on 
the north and defendant's property on the south. The 
possession of the disputed ground was in the defendants 
as of the date of viewing as was shown by the witnesses 
called and the documentary evidence, including photographs, 
that were submitted to the court. 
10. There is no record title in either of 
the defendants to the property in dispute. The defendants 
legal title to their north boundaries is along a fence 
approximately from point P to point 0 on Exhibits 8 and 12. 
11. The acquisition of title by plaintiffs' 
through the tax deed to George Collard of May, 19 51 include 
! a 20 foot strip within Halladays chain of title to parcels 
6 and 7. 
12. Plaintiffs' chain of title to parcels 6 
and 7 and the area north of points M to N on Exhibits 8 and 
12 was not based on the tax sale. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that neither the tax 
title limitation statutes nor the succeeding to legal title 
by tax deed cut off the defendants claims to title by 
acquiescence to the property within the fences described 
as M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12. 
2. The plaintiffs have established the 
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elements for boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-hatched 
green area in parcel 3 on Exhibit 12 by establishing: 
(a) Occupation by defendants and their 
predecessors in interest up to a visible line marked definitely 
by fences and other visible monuments. 
(b) Acquiescence in the line as to the 
boundary. 
(c) For a long period of years. 
(d) By adjoining land owners. 
3. The defendants Bigelow have established 
the elements of a boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-
hatched area in brown on Exhibit 12 in parcel 1 by the same 
standards set forth m paragraph 2 above. 
4. The defendants have established title by 
acquiescence to the property within the fences described as 
points M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 by the same standards set 
forth in paragraph 2 above. 
5. The court concludes that as to each of 
the above matters, the respective parties have established 
their title by acquiescence pursuant to the rulings in 
Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964); 
Hales vs. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (1979); and Brown vs. Peterson, 
Supreme Court No. 16785 decided December 18, 1980. 
Dated and signed this *2~<? day of JULY 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
jS^t^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ / 
rqfi George EylBallif, Judge V 
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